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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

GEORGE WESLEY HAMILTON,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890456

Category No. 2

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The two issues presented in this petition for rehearing
are:
1.

What standard of review will this Court apply to a

trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under rules
404(b) and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence?
2.

Did this Court find that it was error for the trial

court to admit testimony of prior violent acts?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On appeal from a second trial, this Court affirmed
defendant's conviction.

One of defendant's claims on appeal was

"that the trial court erred in permitting the State to adduce
testimony during its direct examination of . . . [defendant's]
live-in girlfriend, that [defendant] had physically abused her
prior to the time [the victim] was killed."

State v. Hamilton,

Case No. 890456, slip op. at 9 (Utah Nov. 22, 1991) (a copy of

the full opinion is attached as an addendum)•

As the standard of

review for this claim, this Court stated:
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the
admissibility of evidence under rules 404(b)
and 403, [Utah Rules of Evidence,] we will
not overturn the court's determination unless
it was an abuse of discretion* See State v.
Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989); rState
v, 1Verde, 770 P.2d [116,] 120 [(Utah 1989)].
Hamilton, slip op. at 11.
Also referring to the claim about evidence of prior
violent acts, this Court said:
As to the third claim, although the trial
court erred in admitting evidence of
Hamilton's prior violent act during the
State's direct examination, we find the error
harmless.
Id., slip op. at 1.

Subsequently, after citing the standard of

review, the Court said:
Under the above-stated standard of review,
only prejudicial errors in admitting evidence
are subject to reversal. . . . On the facts
of this case, therefore, we need not
determine definitively whether the evidence
was admitted improperly, because we conclude
that any error in its admission was harmless.
Id., slip op. at 11 (citations omitted).

Finally, in conclusion,

the Court stated:
Because we conclude that the error is
sufficiently inconsequential that there is no
substantial likelihood that the outcome would
have been different absent admission of this
evidence on direct examination, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Id., slip op. at 12.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart

stated that he did not believe the admission of evidence of prior
violent acts was error; consequently, he thought "the majority's
-2-

application of the harmless error doctrine [was] superfluous."
Id., slip op. at 13.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts pertinent to this petition are set forth in
the Statement of the Case, above.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court's use of the abuse of discretion standard in
reviewing the trial court's ruling admitting evidence of prior
violent acts appears to revert to a terminology termed
"inappropriate" by this Court in State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv.
Rep. 7, 16, n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991).

This petition seeks

clarification of the use of that standard of review and
terminology.
The majority of the Court expressly stated that it
"need not determine" whether admission of the prior acts evidence
was error, and yet it twice refers to the admission as error.
This petition seeks clarification of the issue of whether the
trial court erred in admitting the challenged evidence.
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact.
App. P. 35(a).

Utah R.

The petition for rehearing is properly before the

Court and should be granted.

-3-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT'S
ADMISSIBILITY CLAIM EY CITING TO STATE V,
RAMIREZ, 159 UTAH ADV. REP. 7 (UTAH APRIL 23,
1991), WHICH EXPLAINED EARLIER DECISIONS
ABOUT THE STANDARD.
In reviewing defendant's claim that the trial court
erred by admitting testimony by defendant's girlfriend of prior
violent acts against her, this Court applied the abuse of
discretion standard found in State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419
(Utah 1989),and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).
In doing so, this Court made no reference to its lengthy review
of that standard in State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16,
n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991).

In Ramirez, this Court stated:

[A] closer inspection of [earlier] cases
reveals that the "abuse of discretion"
terminology is used inappropriately. Whether
a piece of evidence is admissible is a
question of law, and we always review
questions of law under a correctness
standard. . . .
When viewed closely, the cited cases
appear actually to have applied this
standard. The confusion is rooted in the
fact that on occasion, the legal standard for
admissibility of evidence vests a measure of
discretion in the trial court. For example,
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 requires that a
trial court balance the probativeness of a
piece of evidence against its potential for
unfair prejudice; if the potential for unfair
prejudice outweighs the probativeness, the
evidence is excludable as a matter of law.
Utah R. Evid. 403. The trial court initially
performs that balancing. If it concludes
that the evidence is admissible, we review
that decision for correctness. But in
deciding whether the trial court erred as a
matter of law, we de facto grant it some
-4-

discretion, because we reverse only if we
conclude that it acted unreasonably in
striking the balance. . . . If we conclude
that the trial court erred, we may
characterize that ruling as "an abuse of
discretion," but in reality, we have found
that the court committed legal error and that
the unfairly prejudicial potential of the
evidence outweighs its probativeness.
159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, n.3.

Confusion arises because the

Court cited to the earlier Larson and Verde decisions for
applying the "abuse of discretion" standard, without reference to
subsequent explanation of that standard given in Ramirez.

Is the

Court reverting back to the facially more deferential standard of
the earlier cases?

While petitioner does not believe that that

is the direction the Court is taking, the use of earlier cases
for the standard, coupled with no mention of Ramirez, creates
confusion.

Therefore, the Court should modify its opinion to

clarify the standard of review.
POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD CLARIFY WHETHER IT
DETERMINED THAT ADMISSION OF PRIOR VIOLENT
ACTS WAS ERROR.
In the opening and concluding paragraphs of the
majority opinion in this case, the Court referred to the trial
court's admission of evidence of defendant's prior violent acts
as error.

Hamilton, slip op. at 1 and 12. However, in analyzing

the issue, the majority wrote:
On the facts of this case, therefore, we need
not determine definitively whether the
evidence was admitted improperly, because we
conclude that any error in its admission was
harmless.
-5-

Id,, slip op. at 11 (citations omitted).

In a concurring

opinion, Justice Stewart opined that admission of the evidence
was not error and consequently, the harraless error analysis was
"superfluous."

id.., slip op. at 13. Justice Stewart concluded

that the evidence of prior violent acts was admissible because
"it was highly relevant to explain [the witness's] alibi
stories."

.Id. (citing generally State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172

(Utah 1987)).
Petitioner urges this Court to adopt the view of
Justice Stewart that there was no error in admission of the
evidence.

Alternatively, if the Court "need not determine

definitively whether the evidence was admitted improperly," .id.. ,
slip op. at 11, petitioner requests that the Court delete the
references to the admission as being error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should grant
rehearing and modify its opinion to conform to more recent
pronouncements of Utah law on the issue of the standard of
review, and to be internally consistent on the issue of whether
the trial court erred in admitting the challenged evidence.

-6-

The State certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

ti

day of December,

1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing petition for rehearing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to G. Fred Metos, Hatch, McCaughey & Metos, Attorneys
for Defendant, 72 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
this

S—

day of December, 1991.
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ADDENDUM

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OoOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

No. 890456
FILED
November 22, 1991

v.
George Wesley Hamilton,
Defendant and Appellant.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Fourth District, Millard County
The Honorable George E. Ballif
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant George Wesley Hamilton appeals his
conviction of second degree murder, a first degree felony.
Hamilton raises three claims of error: (i) insufficiency of
the evidence to support the conviction; (ii) failure to
instruct the jury on the nature and effect of fingerprint
evidence; and (iii) improper admission of evidence concerning
other violent acts by Hamilton- With regard to Hamilton's
first two claims, we find no error. As to the third claim,
although the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
Hamilton's prior violent act during the State's direct
examination/ we find the error harmless. We therefore affirm
Hamilton's conviction.
In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the verdict. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285
(Utah 1989), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 1837
(1990); State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985). We
recite the facts accordingly. Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d
1156, 1158 (Utah 1991); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117
(Utah 1989).
Sharon L. Sant was a student at Southern Utah State
College in Cedar City, Utah, during the summer of 1985.
Around the end of July 1985, Sant told a friend, Cheryl Cox,
that she intended to return to her hometown of Fillmore, Utah,

to attend the funeral services of some high school friends.
On August 1, after failing to obtain other transportation,
Sant started to hitchhike from Cedar City to Fillmore. One of
Sant's co-workers, Royce Barton, saw her at approximately
11:45 a.m. at a northbound on-ramp of Interstate 15 in Cedar
City. She never arrived in Fillmore. Cox reported Sant
missing on August 6, 1985.
Beginning in March 1985, defendant George Wesley
Hamilton worked for Arnold Foch Parkinson on a ranch Parkinson
leased north of Paragonah, Utah. Paragonah is twenty-two
miles north of Cedar City on 1-15, between Cedar City and
Fillmore. Hamilton's co-worker on the ranch was Robert Bott.
In early July, Hamilton stopped working full time for
Parkinson. He then split his time between cutting firewood in
the Paragonah area and working on the ranch. He continued to
alternate between ranch work and woodcutting into early 1986.
On the morning of August 1, 1985, the owner of the
ranch could not find Hamilton, Bott, or Parkinson on the
ranch. Later that afternoon, while shopping at the M&D Market
in Parowan, Utah, five miles north of Paragonah along 1-15,
Jacklyn Smith saw Hamilton and Bott in the store's parking
lot. She saw Bott and a woman later identified as Sant seated
in the cab of Hamilton's flatbed truck. She also saw Hamilton
leave the store with a twelve-can pack of Budweiser beer, put
the beer in the back of the truck, and then get into the
driver's side of the truck cab. Hamilton, Bott, and Sant then
drove away.
On August 16, 1985, a Utah Department of
Transportation employee working near a frontage road and a
northbound on-ramp of 1-15 at Cove Fort, Utah, noticed some
curious marks leading away from the road into some scrub
trees. Upon investigation, he and two co-workers determined
that they were drag marks. They followed the marks and
discovered a small mound of dirt that had "sticks and an oily
residue coming up through the dirt [to the] top of the
mound." After the workers noticed what appeared to be a dried
intestine on top of the mound, they left the area undisturbed
and contacted police.
Officers of the Millard County Sheriffs Office
arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. The officers opened
the mound and found the unclothed, mutilated remains of a
female. Both hands, feet, and breasts, the head, and the left
arm had been removed. The left arm was in the grave between
the legs of the torso. The body had been cut open from the
breast bone to the pubic bone and the uterus and other sexual
organs apparently had been removed. Sometime later, officers
assisted by a canine team discovered breast tissue under a
bush some thirty-nine feet from the grave. The deputy who
discovered the tissue testified that there was "grease or a
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skid mark" about two feet long that led under the bush. "It
was like the rolling of the dirt as if the item had struck the
ground and skidded up underneath the bush." The other missing
body parts were never recovered.
About seventy-five feet from the grave site, officers
located a wood-splitting maul. The officers testified that
the maul had been used in excavating the shallow grave. The
maul carried traces of blood at the base of the metal head, on
the wooden portion at the top of the head, and on the bottom
of the handle. Investigators were unable to determine the
blood type because there was an insufficient quantity of
blood. The officers were likewise unable to recover
fingerprints from the handle of the maul. Testimony at trial
indicated that Ronald Frank Johnson, owner of a Parowan
service station at which Hamilton was a regular customer, had
seen a similar maul in Hamilton's truck in July 1985. Johnson
further testified that in November 1985, he had noticed that a
similar, but newer, maul had replaced the one he had seen in
July.
In addition to the maul, officers recovered a
considerable amount of physical evidence from the crime scene,
including blood stains and hair recovered from gravel at the
edge of the roadway. The hair was found to be similar to
samples of Sant's hair taken from her hair brush and
clothing. Similar hair was also found in Hamilton's truck.
In addition, the two-hundred-foot drag trail, which began at
the road and ended at the grave, was spotted in numerous
places with type O-positive human blood. Both Sant and
Hamilton had this blood type. Specifically, officers
recovered blood samples from stained soil and tree and
sagebrush branches along the drag trail. Police testified
that one area of the drag trail, which they called the
•'mutilation point," was particularly "covered with blood."
Near this point, officers found a piece of cardboard with
blood on it and a blood-stained beer bottle in the bushes.
There were two bloody fingerprints on the bottle—one on the
outside and one just inside the neck. The fingerprint on the
outside was identified as Hamilton's. Although the other
fingerprint had a whorl similar to one of Hamilton's, it did
not have enough detail to positively identify it as his.
Evidence showed that the beer bottle was manufactured between
September and December of 1979. It would have been shipped to
the bottler within thirty days of manufacture and filled and
shipped immediately to the distributor.
Officers also collected five Budweiser cans near the
drag trail. They lifted four latent fingerprints from two of
the cans. Two of Hamilton's fingerprints were found on one
can. Another of Hamilton's prints and a print of a man
identified as Michael Perry were found on the second can.
Evidence showed that three of the five beer cans were filled
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on July 2, 1985, and possibly were packaged together. The can
with two of Hamilton's prints was one of these three. A
fourth can, which had no identifiable prints, was packaged on
July 1, 1985. The fifth can, which had the fingerprints of
Hamilton and Perry, was packaged August 5, 1985. A Budweiser
representative testified that Budweiser cans packed in a
twelve-pack purchased from the M&D Market in Parowan on
August 1st were packaged on July 1 and 2, 1985.
Dr. Edwin Sweeney, acting state medical examiner,
examined the remains of the body. Through comparison of X-ray
records, Dr. Sweeney identified the remains as Sanfs. He
testified that the marks on the body were consistent with the
removal of the head, hands, feet, and one arm with a blunt
instrument, such as the wood-splitting maul found at the
scene. He also testified that the incision in the torso was
made with a sharp instrument such as a knife and that the
incisions around the breasts were made with the same type of
instrument. Although Dr. Sweeney testified that the presence
of blood and hair samples that appeared "somewhat squashed or
stuck" in the gravel near the road implied that the victim had
suffered a blow to the head, he was unable to determine the
cause of death or whether the incisions and mutilation of the
body occurred before or after death without the head. The
decomposition of the body, however, was consistent with Sanfs
dying on August 1st.
On January 29, 1986, an anonymous informant
telephoned police and said that Hamilton might have
participated in the Sant murder. After several weeks of
investigation, both Hamilton and Bott were arrested and
charged with first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping.
The prosecutor granted Bott immunity, and he was never tried.
Hamilton, on the other hand, was eventually tried on an
amended information which charged second degree murder,
aggravated sexual assault, and forcible sexual abuse.
Hamilton was convicted of second degree murder; the aggravated
sexual assault and sexual abuse charges were dismissed.
Because of jury misconduct, the trial court set aside the
conviction and ordered a new trial on the second degree murder
charge. After the second trial, the new jury panel found
Hamilton guilty of second degree murder. Hamilton appeals his
conviction from the second trial.
Hamilton makes three claims of error: first, that
there was insufficient evidence that he participated in the
murder of Sharon Sant; second, that the trial court erred when
it refused to instruct the jury that before it could consider
the fingerprint evidence against Hamilton, it must determine
that the fingerprints at the scene were left at the time of
the murder; and finally, that the trial court erred when it
allowed the State to introduce evidence of his specific acts
of violence against a witness who was not a victim of the
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crime with which he was charged. On the first point, Hamilton
argues that the verdict should be reversed and the case
remanded to the district court with an order that a judgment
of acquittal be entered. On the second and third points, he
contends that the judgment should be reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial. We will consider each of Hamilton's
claims separately.
We note the standard for review applicable to
Hamilton's first claim. When a jury verdict is challenged on
the ground that the evidence is insufficient, our scrutiny of
the evidence is limited:
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict of
the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was
convicted.
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)); accord State v.
Vjtr££, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989); State v. McCardell. 652
P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982). We will not substitute our
judgment for that of the jury. State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,
231 (Utah 1980) .
Hamilton points out that all the evidence used to
convict him is circumstantial. Although he recognizes that a
number of pieces of circumstantial evidence link him to Sant
and the burial scene, the thrust of his insufficiency claim is
that the only real evidence against him is the fingerprint
evidence recovered from the bottle and the cans at the burial
site. He relies on cases from other jurisdictions for the
proposition that fingerprint evidence alone, especially when
found on movable objects commonly located in places accessible
to the public, is insufficient to support a conviction unless
it can be shown that the fingerprints were left at the time
and place of the commission of the crime. See United States
v, CorSP, 439 F.2d 956, 957 (4th Cir. 1971); Sorev v. Stat*.
419 So. 2d 810, 812-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Fladuna v.
State, 4 Md. App. 664, 668-69, 244 A.2d 909, 911 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Cichv, 227 Pa. Super. 480, 483, 323 A.2d 817,
818-19 (1974). Essentially, he argues that the evidence here
is insufficient because it does not exclude every reasonable
hypothesis that the fingerprints might have been left at a
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time or place other than when and where the crime was
committed.1
Hamilton's interpretation of the facts and law
relative to the fingerprint evidence is incorrect. We first
address the law. There are two general approaches to the
weight that may be afforded fingerprint evidence. The first,
which is based on an American Law Reports annotation, views
fingerprint evidence with skepticism: "To warrant a
conviction, the fingerprints corresponding to those of the
accused must have been found in the place where the crime was
committed under such circumstances that they could only have
been impressed at the time when the crime was committed."
Annotation, Fingerprints, Palm Prints, or Bare Foot Prints as
Evidence, 28 A.L.R,2d § 29, at 1154 (1953); see also Borum v.
United States, 380 F.2d 595, 596-97 (D,C. Cir. 1967); State v.
Burton, 144 Ariz. 248, 252-53, 697 P.2d 331, 335-36 (1985);
McNeil v. State, 227 Md. 298, 300, 176 A.2d 338, 339 (1961);
Reed v. State, 95 Nev. 190, 194, 591 P.2d 274, 276 (1979);
Knight v. State, 185 Ga. App. 619, 622, 365 S.E.2d 484, 486-87
(1988)- In addition, where only fingerprint evidence links
the defendant to the crime, such evidence is insufficient to
support a conviction, Borum, 380 F.2d at 596-97,
Some jurisdictions apply a variant of the first
approach. While purporting to follow the A.L.R./£jQ_rum
approach, they actually have modified it in practice. They
appear to follow A.L.R./Borum only when questionable
fingerprint evidence is the only evidence inculpating the
defendant. See Corso, 439 F.2d at 957. In instances where
additional evidence supports the conviction, these courts
generally treat fingerprint evidence as they do other
circumstantial evidence. They allow the trier of fact to
determine the weight it is to be given. See, e.g., United
States v. Talbert, 710 F,2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
1. With regard to the "no reasonable alternative hypothesis"
theory upon which defendant proceeds, we note that this court
has previously indicated that this is only one way of stating
the prosecution's burden of proof, which requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Eaale, 611 P.2d 1211,
1213 (Utah 1980). Such an instruction need not be given in
these terms in every circumstantial evidence case. Jji. In
the present case, the trial court did give a "no reasonable
alternative hypothesis" instruction.
We also note that although a jury can convict only upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the
charged crime, on appeal, we need not be convinced in our own
minds beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, we must uphold the
jury verdict unless reasonable minds could not have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime.
Verde, 770 P.2d at 444; BPPKer, 709 P.2d at 345; State v.
Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983).
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denied, 464 U.S. 1052 (1984); United States v. Phillips, 664
F.2d 971, 1033 (5th Cir. 1981), cert, denied sub nom.
Meinster v. United States. 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United
States v. Harris. 530 F.2d 576, 579 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Bonds, 526 F.2d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1976), cert,
denied, 429 U.S. 843 (1976); United States v. Roustio, 455
F.2d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Scarce!lino,
431 F.2d 475, 478 (8th Cir. 1970).
The second approach treats fingerprint evidence like
any other piece of circumstantial evidence whether or not
there is additional evidence. For example, in Mason v.
Commonwealth, 357 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1962), the court observed:
It has been stated as the general rule
that fingerprints alone will support a
conviction only if they are found in the
place where the crime was committed "under
such circumstances that they could only
have been impressed at the time when the
crime was committed." To accept this
choice of words would, it seems to us,
refute the oft-repeated rule in this state
that "if there is any evidence, however
slight or circumstantial, which tends to
show guilt of the crime charged or any of
its degrees, it is the trial court's duty
to submit the case to the jury."
Id. at 668 (citations and emphasis omitted); see also Bruce v.
State, 268 Ind. 180, 257-58, 375 N.E.2d 1042, 1082-83, cert,
denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); Wilcox v. State, 356 So. 2d 887,
889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd on other grounds. 367
So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1979); People v. Willis, 60 Mich. App. 154,
158-59, 230 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Ct. App. 1975). This latter
approach is in line with Utah case law. We have always
treated fingerprint evidence like any other evidence and have
never evaluated its sufficiency to support a conviction by a
separate, more stringent standard. See State v. Bailey, 712
P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1985); State v. Jollev, 571 P.2d 582, 585
(Utah 1977); In re Marcruez, 560 P.2d 342, 343 (Utah 1977);
State v. Washington, 17 Utah 2d 149, 150, 405 P.2d 793, 793
(1965).
Hamilton urges that we follow A.L.R./fioxum and treat
fingerprint evidence as though it is subject to reliability
problems similar to those that affect eyewitness
identification evidence. Science has shown eyewitness
identification testimony to have inherent weaknesses that
almost universally are unappreciated by jurors. Fingerprint
evidence, however, presents no analogous accuracy problems.
Questions that go to the weight to be accorded fingerprint
evidence are fairly obvious and straightforward and are
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subject to complete illumination through cross-examination and
jury argument. Thus, we find no reason to conclude that
fingerprint evidence differs from any other circumstantial
evidence. The jury can weigh it with the rest of the evidence
in determining a defendant's guilt.
In the present case, when the fingerprint evidence is
considered along with all the other evidence linking Hamilton
to Sant and the crime scene, it is apparent that there was
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Hamilton had participated in the murder
of Sharon Sant.
Closely related to Hamilton's insufficiency of the
evidence claim is his second contention, i.e., that the trial
court erred in refusing to give an instruction on the nature
and effect of fingerprint evidence.
We first address the standard by which jury
instruction rulings are reviewed. A trial court has a duty to
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the
case. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). The
defendant has a right "to have his [or her] theory of the case
presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." Id.
at 78; see also State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052, 1058 (Utah
1985). However, a trial court can refuse to give an
instruction that misstates the law. State v. Standiford, 769
P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988); State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 75,
498 P.2d 357, 359 (1972). And it "is not error to refuse a
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the
other instructions." State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647
(Utah 1982); Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d at 75, 498 P.2d at 359.
Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury
instruction constitutes error is a question of law, which we
review for correctness, Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133
(Utah 1989); Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v.
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987).
The proposed fingerprint instruction the trial court
declined to give essentially states that the jury cannot
consider evidence of Hamilton's fingerprints on the cans and
bottle unless the jury first finds that there is no possibility
that Hamilton left the prints at a time other than during the
commission of the crime.2 Hamilton contends that this
2.

Hamilton's proposed instruction is as follows:
The state has offered circumstantial
evidence in the nature of fingerprints in
this case. You are instructed to consider
this evidence along with all other evidence
in making your determination of whether the
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
(Continued on page 9.)
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instruction was required because the fingerprint evidence
might have misled the jury. Specifically, Hamilton contends
that the fact that the prints were found at the scene of the
crime might lead the jury to give them undue weight and to
discount the fact that they were found on movable articles
located in an area easily accessible to the public. In
essence, Hamilton argues for a special cautionary instruction
on fingerprint evidence analogous to the instruction we have
required when eyewitness identification testimony is presented
in a case. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986);
see also State v. Ramirez. 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 10 (1991).
Because we have held that fingerprint evidence is not entitled
to special treatment, the trial court did not err when it
refused to give Hamilton's proposed instruction.3
Turning to the final claim on appeal, Hamilton argues
that the trial court erred in permitting the State to adduce
testimony during its direct examination of Rita Weatherby,
Hamilton's live-in girlfriend, that Hamilton had physically
abused her prior to the time Sant was killed. Hamilton argues
that this evidence violated rule 404 of the rules of evidence
in that it allowed evidence of Hamilton's character that had
no other evidentiary purpose but to show that Hamilton acted
in conformity to his character. Hamilton also argues that the
evidence was more prejudicial than probative under rule 403.
(Footnote 2 continued.)
offense as charged in the information.
However, before you may find the defendant
guilty on the basis of fingerprint
evidence, you must find that the print was
made at the time of the incident for which
the defendant is charged. However, if the
circumstances are such that the print
could have been impressed at a time other
than that of the incident for which the
defendant is charged, then you are not to
consider the fingerprint evidence with
respect to the defendant's guilt. The
circumstances to consider in determining
whether the print was impressed when the
crime was committed include, but are not
limited to, the location of the print, the
character of the place or premises where
the print was found and whether the object
would be inaccessible to the defendant
except in the commission of the crime.
3. This does not imply that it is error for a trial court to
give a cautionary instruction about fingerprint evidence, or
any other type of evidence, where the prosecution's case is
entirely circumstantial. We do not understand Justice Stewart
to disagree on this point.
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Before the examination that resulted in Weatherby's
statements, the court held an in camera hearing on the
testimony's admissibility. The State proffered evidence that
Weatherby would testify that on three different occasions she
had given police inconsistent statements concerning
Hamilton's whereabouts on August 1, 1985. Her testimony
would be that she had told police on two occasions that she
was with Hamilton on August 1st. During a third interview
with police, she said that she was not with Hamilton on
August 1st and that she had lied earlier about being with
him. The State proferred that Weatherby would say she had
lied earlier because Hamilton had asked her to provide him
with an alibi for August 1st and she had agreed to give it
because she was afraid of him. She would testify that she
was afraid of Hamilton because he had hit her during the time
she lived with him.
Hamilton objected on two grounds to the admission of
the evidence that he had struck Weatherby. First, he
contended that the evidence was offered to prove that his
killing Sant would be consistent with proof that violence
against women was part of his basic character. Such evidence
as to character is not admissible under rule 404(b). That
rule requires that for the evidence of specific acts to be
admissible, it must have some purpose other than proof that
the charges against the defendant are consistent with his
character, "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). The second ground for
objecting to the evidence's admissibility was the likelihood
that it would be unfairly prejudicial and should be excluded
under rule 403. Utah R. Evid. 403.
The court overruled both objections. As to the
404(b) objection, the court reasoned that the evidence was
admissible because "it is a direct statement relative to the
very issue in the case here and relevant to a description of
and actions of the defendant as it relates to his being a
suspect in the homicide that is here being investigated."
Regarding the 403 objection, the court said:
Now, as far as the prejudicial effect and
as far as it being a specific instance of
bad conduct—being assaultive—it is not an
independent or an isolated one* This is
one related to the very witness who could
or could not provide him with what he
wanted by way of an alibi, and his actions
pertaining to his enforcement of that
request. So that would not fall within the
rule that you're citing there, and the
court would deny the motion on that ground.
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The evidence was then admitted. Although it is difficult to
determine the precise basis for the admission of the evidence,
it appears that the court found there was an independent basis
for admission of the evidence outside of the specific
exceptions listed in rule 404(b), namely, that it established
that defendant was attempting to create a false alibi, a fact
that raises an inference of an admission of culpability. The
court also found that the probativeness of this evidence was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the
admissibility of evidence under rules 404(b) and 403, we will
not overturn the court's determination unless it was an abuse
of discretion. See State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah
1989); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120.
Under the above-stated standard of review, only
prejudicial errors in admitting evidence are subject to
reversal. Therefore, even if we were to assume that the
evidence here was improperly admitted as part of the State's
case because it constituted improper bolstering of the
prosecution's witness during the presentation of the State's
case-in-chief and before the defense attacked the credibility
of the witness, that would not satisfy the abuse-of-discretion
standard. We would still have to consider whether the error
was prejudicial. On the facts of this case, therefore, we
need not determine definitively whether the evidence was
admitted improperly, because we conclude that any error in its
admission was harmless. Larson, 775 P.2d at 419; Verde, 770
P.2d at 120.
••Harmless" errors are -errors which, although
properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings." Verde, 770 P.2d at 120; Utah R. Crim. P.
30(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ, P. 61. Although it
is somewhat difficult to state exactly when an error is such
that it would result in a "reasonable likelihood" of a
different result, we have attempted to give a more concrete
definition of such an error in State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913
(Utah 1987), where we held, "For an error to require reversal,
the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently
high to undermine confidence in the verdict." Idt at 920.
Here, the error is not one that undermines our confidence in
the verdict.
In making this determination, we consider a host of
factors including, among others, the importance of the
witness's testimony to the prosecution's case and the overall
strength of the State's case. £££ State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d
200, 205 (Utah 1987). The more evidence supporting the
verdict, the less likely there was harmful error, ifl. Here,
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the evidence consisted of testimony that Hamilton had been
abusive to a woman on a prior occasion. It came during Rita
Weatherby's testimony while explaining why she had lied about
being with Hamilton on August 1, 1985. Clearly, evidence that
Hamilton had acted violently towards a woman on a previous
occasion was damaging evidence, and if it were the only
evidence or one of the only pieces of evidence before the
jury, we might well consider it so prejudicial as to undermine
our confidence in the verdict. That is not the case here.
Weatherby's statement, in the context of the entire case, is
not so significant that it should be afforded great weight,
especially when viewed against all the other evidence linking
Hamilton to Sant and the burial site.
Because we conclude that the error is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no substantial likelihood that
the outcome would have been different absent admission of this
evidence on direct examination, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

STEWART. Justice:

(Concurring)

In my view, the trial court properly rejected the
defendant's proposed instruction with respect to the weight
the jury could give to the fingerprint evidence because the
fingerprint evidence was not the only evidence linking the
defendant to the crime and, more important, because the
proposed instruction could have given the jurors the
impression that they should consider only the fingerprint
evidence on that point. On the facts of this case, the
instruction could have been confusing and misleading.
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Nevertheless, an instruction on fingerprint evidence
along the lines of that proposed by the defendant may well be
appropriate, or even mandatory, when there is no other
significant evidence pertaining to identity. For example, if
the only evidence linking a defendant to a crime is
fingerprint evidence and ambiguous circumstantial evidence as
to when the fingerprint was impressed, an instruction would be
appropriate and, perhaps, required.
In addition, I do not believe that the admission of
Rita Weatherby's statement that the defendant had hit her,
made in the context of explaining why she had changed the
alibi story that she had given to the police, was error. This
Court has been careful to require that prior crime evidence
have special relevance to the facts of the case, and I
certainly do not suggest departing from that fundamental rule
of fairness. Nevertheless, in this case, I believe that the
statement was within our rules allowing for admissibility
since it was highly relevant to explain Weatherby's alibi
stories. See generally State v. Forsvth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah
1987). In my view, the majority's application of the harmless
error doctrine is superfluous.
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